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General Assembly Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/46/607
S/23178
30 October 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-sixth session
Agenda item 45
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-sixth year

Letter dated 29 October 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter addressed to you from His Excellency Mr. George Iacovou, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex were circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 45, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Andreas MAVROMMATIS
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
Cyprus to the United Nations

ANNEX

Letter dated 28 October 1991 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cyprus to the Secretary-General

I have read with concern the letter dated 21 October 1991 addressed to you from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Turkey circulated as an annex to General Assembly and Security Council document A/46/584-S/23156, dated 21 October 1991.

This letter was intended to reaffirm the Turkish Government's position on Cyprus and "to clarify in this light" its understanding of the various elements in Security Council resolution 716 (1991). It explained that Turkey had certain "reservations and objections" and that its contributions are made on the basis of "bringing into proper perspective the dimensions of the solution being sought under the good offices mission of the Secretary-General".

Having expressed what Turkey "wishes to believe" was not the intention of the Security Council with reference to its resolution 716 (1991), it proceeds with its untenable interpretation of parts of the resolution and reiterates its objection to certain aspects of the Secretary-General's report (S/23121) of 8 October 1991, which was endorsed by paragraph 1 of Council resolution 716 (1991).

It is my belief that, at this stage and before a new Government assumes office in Turkey, a detailed reply to the points raised in the aforementioned letter should not be given. I would, however, like to place on record that given their nature, Security Council resolutions cannot be subjected to arbitrary or selective interpretation to sustain one's position or be subject to preconditions.

It is axiomatic that parties involved in efforts, in accordance with the Charter for the peaceful settlement of disputes, cannot unilaterally impose preconditions to progress or limit the discretion of the Secretary-General in the discharge of his mission of good offices.

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/23179
30 October 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

# NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON CAMBODIA

1. On 23 October 1991, the Paris Conference on Cambodia adopted the following instruments:

(a) Final Act of the Paris Conference on Cambodia;

(b) Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, with annexes on the mandate for the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, military matters, elections, repatriation of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons, and the principles for a new Cambodian constitution;

(c) Agreement Concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality and National Unity of Cambodia;

(d) Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia.

2. By a letter dated 30 October 1991, the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations and the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the United Nations, on behalf of the Co-Presidents of the Paris Conference on Cambodia, requested circulation of these instruments (S/23177).

3. In accordance with the request addressed to me in paragraph 12 of the Final Act of the Paris Conference, I am hereby drawing the attention of the Security Council to this matter, in order to enable it to consider the comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodia conflict at the earliest opportunity.

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91-36157 2729h (E)

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/23180
31 October 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/FRENCH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 668 (1990) of 20 September 1990 and 717 (1991) of 16 October 1991,

Welcoming the meeting in Paris, on 23 October 1991, of the Paris Conference on Cambodia (PCC) at ministerial level, at which the agreements on a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodia conflict were signed,

Having considered the agreements on a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodia conflict (S/23177),

Noting that those agreements provide inter alia for the designation of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the establishment of a United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC),

Noting further that it is the intention of the Secretary-General to send a survey mission to Cambodia as soon as possible to prepare a plan for implementing the mandate envisaged in the agreements, for submission to the Security Council,

Underlining the necessity for the full cooperation of the Supreme National Council of Cambodia, and all Cambodians for their part, in the implementation of the agreements,

1. Expresses its full support for the agreements on a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodia conflict, signed in Paris on 23 October 1991 (S/23177);

2. Authorizes the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative for Cambodia to act on his behalf;

3. Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to send a survey mission to Cambodia as soon as possible to prepare a plan for implementing the mandate envisaged in the agreements;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to submit at the earliest possible date a report containing his implementation plan, including in particular a detailed estimate of the cost of UNTAC, on the understanding that this report would be the basis on which the Council would authorize the establishment of UNTAC, the budget of UNTAC to be subsequently considered and approved in accordance with the provisions of Article 17 of the Charter of the United Nations;

5. Calls upon all Cambodian parties to comply fully with the cease-fire that entered into force at the time of the signature of the agreements;

6. Calls upon the Supreme National Council of Cambodia, and all Cambodians for their part, to cooperate fully with the United Nations in the implementation of the agreements on a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodia conflict.

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/23181
30 October 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 30 OCTOBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF BELGIUM, FRANCE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

We have the honour to bring to your attention the text, in French and English, of a declaration on Yugoslavia, adopted by the European Community and its member States at their ministerial meeting held in Brussels on 28 October 1991.

We should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex distributed as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Paul NOTERDAEME
Permanent Representative of
Belgium to the United Nations

(Signed) Jean-Bernard P. H. P. MERIMEE
Permanent Representative of France to
the United Nations

(Signed) Sir David HANNAY
Permanent Representative of the
United Kingdom to the United Nations

Annex

[Original: English and French]

Declaration on the situation in Yugoslavia

The European Community and its member States assessed the results of the seventh plenary session of the Yugoslav Conference, which took place on 25 October 1991 at The Hague under the chairmanship of Lord Carrington.

They concluded that five republics reiterated their readiness to cooperate on the basis of the draft arrangements, submitted by Lord Carrington and the Presidency. They also noted that one republic continued to reserve its position.

The European Community and its member States remain convinced that only a comprehensive arrangement, based on the principles as reflected in the draft arrangements submitted to the Yugoslav Conference, will ensure a peaceful solution to the present crisis. Notably, the principles of no unilateral change of borders, protection of human rights and rights of ethnic and national groups constitute universal, objective standards, which leave no room for compromise.

The European Community and its member Staes are appalled at constant violations of these principles. In this context they refer to the Serbian position in the Conference, the coup d'état by four members of the Federal Presidency and their annourcement of a plan aimed at the establishment of a Greater Serbia. The statements and actions of the Yugoslav National Army, which were condemned in the Declaration on Dubrovnik of 27 October 1991, should also be seen in this light.

If the Yugoslavia Conference is to succeed, these principles must be unequivocally accepted by all the parties, which means that the Serbian reserve must be lifted. If at the next plenary session of the Conference, on 5 November, the Serbian reserve is lifted, the Conference, as presently consitituted, will continue on the basis of the draft arrangements.

If not, the Conference will proceed with the cooperative republics to obtain a political solution, in the perspective of recognition of the independence of those republics wishing it, at the end of a negotiating process conducted in good faith as set out at Haarzuilens on 6 October. Non-cooperative parties can then expect restrictive measures to be taken against them by the European Community and its member States.

The European Community and its member States will ask the Security Council to urgently address the question of further restrictive measures under chapter VII. Ministers will take up the question of restrictive measures at their meeting of 4 November in view of a decision in the margin of a subsequent meeting later in the week on the basis of the results of the next plenary session of the Conference, on 5 November.

In view of the significance of the meeting of 5 November the coordinator of the Conference, Ambassador Wijnaendts, will meet with relevant parties in Yugoslavia in a final attempt to bridge remaining differences. Lord Carrington will inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations today. In the meantime the working groups of the Conference will continue to elaborate and refine the arrangements for the comprehensive settlement.

The European Community and its member States call on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe as well as on the Security Council of the United Nations to continue to express support for their endeavours to bring about a peaceful solution to the Yugoslav crisis and to denounce the role played by the Yugoslav National Army and the coup d'état by four members of the Federal Presidency.

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/23182
31 October 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 29 OCTOBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I should like to inform you that the United States Air Force continues to violate Iraqi airspace and that the violations have been as follows:

I

1. The United States Air Force continued to violate Iraqi airspace on 26/27 October 1991 for purposes of surveillance and provocation with 28 sorties flown by 14 two-aircraft formations at speeds of 700 to 800 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 3,000 to 4,500 metres. Their flights were centred on Irbil, Mosul, Tall Afar, Sinjar, Ayn Zalah, Dohuk, Zakho and Amadiyah.

2. At 0800 hours on the same day, two F-16s overflew Firnas airfield at a speed of 600 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 500 metres.

3. At 0910 hours on the same day, two Jaguar aircraft overflew Faruq airfield at a speed of 600 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 50 metres.

4. At 1000 hours, two F-111s overflew Firnas airfield at a speed of 500 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 500 metres.

5. At 1250 hours, two F-16s overflew Firnas airfield at a speed of 700 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 50 metres.

6. At 1300 hours, two F-16s overflew Faruq airfield at a speed of 500 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 50 metres.

II

1. The United States Air Force continued to violate Iraqi airspace on 27/28 October 1991 for purposes of surveillance and provocation with 27 sorties flown by 13 two-aircraft formations and one single aircraft at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 1,500 to 6,000 metres.

2. Their flights centred on Dohuk, Irbil, Mosul, Zakho, Tall Afar, Amadiyah, Ayn Zalah and Dukan.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/23183
31 October 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 29 OCTOBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I am pleased to transmit herewith a letter dated 29 October 1991 from Mr. Ahmad Hussein, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, informing you that the Turkish side is continuing to violate the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Iraq.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 29 October 1991 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General

Further to our two letters dated 16 October 1991, I have the honour to inform you that the Turkish side is continuing to violate the territorial integrity and overeignty of the Republic of Iraq, targeting the defenceless and innocent in the northern region and their homes. The details are as follows:

1. At 1545 hours on 25 October 1991, Turkish aircraft bombarded the villages of Qunahish and Girgasha in the Amadiyah district. At 1630 hours on the same day, Turkish aircraft bombarded the villages of Shildizah, Balandah, Ziwah, Qunahish, Girgasha, Belegah and Dayri in the Amadiyah district in Dohuk governerate, which resulted in the death and wounding of a number of Iraqi citizens and the destruction of some houses.

2. The Chief of General Staff of the Turkish Army claimed that the Turkish combat planes and helicopters had launched raids on the camps and positions of elements of the Turkish Kurdish Workers' Party in northern Iraq, who, according to his allegation, had established bases for carrying out operations against frontier guard posts and army patrols, taking advantage of the conditions prevailing in the northern region. He added that the Turkish Army operations would continue against what he called "elements of the Workers' Party" and their positions in Iraq as long as it was necessary.

In informing you that the Turkish side's continued repetition of its violations of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Iraq and its endangering of the security and safety of Iraqi citizens on pretexts that are legally inadmissible constitutes a blatant violation of the United Nations Charter and norms of international law and endangers peace and security in the region, I request you to intervene immediately to take effective measures to put an end to the repeated violations of the Turkish side in a manner that makes clear to the international community the unfoundedness of the belief that the United Nations applies a double standard in dealing with the issues of its Member States, inasmuch as the fundamental goal of the United Nations is to achieve peace, to maintain peace and to protect the territorial sovereignty of all Member States.

I request you to have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ahmad HUSSEIN
Minister for Foreign Affairs

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GENERAL

S/23184
31 October 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 31 OCTOBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I should like to inform you that the United States Air Force continues to violate Iraqi airspace and that the violations have been as follows:

1. The United States Air Force continued to violate Iraqi airspace for purposes of surveillance and provocation on 28/29 October 1991 with 22 sorties flown by 11 two-aircraft formations at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 4,000 to 6,000 metres.

2. The flights centred on Zakho, Amadiyah, Irbil, Mosul, Dohuk and Tall Afar.

3. At 1452 hours on the same day, a formation of two United States aircraft crossed the 36th parallel to a depth of 45 kilometres to the north-west of Kirkuk at a speed of 800 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 4,000 metres.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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GENERAL

S/23185
31 October 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 31 OCTOBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ZAIRE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to request you to bring to the notice of the members of the Security Council the Zairian Government's position on the withdrawal of Belgian troops from Zaire.

For humanitarian reasons, the Government of Zaire had already given its agreement to the authorities of the Kingdom of Belgium so that Belgian troops could assist in evacuating Belgian nationals from Zaire subsequent to the events of 23 and 24 September 1991.

Since this evacuation has already come to an end, the Government of Zaire requires the immediate withdrawal of all Belgian troops in Zaire, in view of the fact that their mission has been accomplished, in accordance with the wishes of the Belgian authorities.

(Signed) Bagbeni Adeito NZENGEYA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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GENERAL

S/23186
31 October 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 29 OCTOBER 1991 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 717 (1991) of 16 October 1991 by which the Council decided to establish a United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) immediately after the signing of the agreements for a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodia conflict. As you are aware, these agreements were signed in Paris on 23 October 1991.

Having completed the necessary consultations, I propose that the military elements of UNAMIC be composed of contingents from the following Member States, all of whom have expressed their readiness in principle to make the necessary personnel available: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, France, Germany, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Poland, Senegal, Tunisia, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Uruguay. I am awaiting a reply from one other Member State which has been informally approached and will revert to the Security Council when I have an indication of whether it also is ready in principle to contribute military personnel to this Mission.

I should be grateful if you would bring these matters to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Javier PEREZ de CUELLAR

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91-36406 2741g (E)

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GENERAL

S/23187
31 October 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 31 OCTOBER 1991 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 29 October 1991 (S/23186) concerning the composition of the military elements of the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) has been brought to the attention of the Council members. They agree with the proposal contained in your letter.

(Signed) Chinmaya Rajaninath GHAREKHAN
President of the Security Council

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91-36412 2615c (E)

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/23188
31 October 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 30 OCTOBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring the latest cases of Iraqi violations of the terms of the cease-fire to your attention.

1. On 9 August 1991, an Iranian soldier who had travelled to Mamak village at the geographical coordinates of 29-16 on the map of Alavan was kidnapped by anti-revolutionary elements dispatched from Iraq.

2. On 16 August 1991, from 1900 to 2300 hours, five Iraqi soldiers were observed constructing a bunker at the geographical coordinates of 680-244 on the map of Kani Sheikh.

3. On 19 August 1991, at 0140 hours, several anti-revolutionary elements dispatched from Iraq attached and injured two Iranian soldiers at the geographical coordinates of 91-76 on the map of Siparoz.

4. On 19 August 1991, at 1500 hours, anti-revolutionary elements dispatched from Iraq engaged with Iranian forces at observation post No. 1 of Alvatan and subsequently returned to Iraq.

5. On 20 August 1991, at 1530 hours, anti-revolutionary elements dispatched from Iraq fired from a southerly direction at observation post No. 2 of Alvatan at the geographical coordinates of 203-314 on the map of Alavan. Following the reaction of Iranian forces they returned to Iraq.

6. On 22 August 1991, from 0750 to 1130 hours, eight Iraqi soldiers were observed constructing a bunker at the geographical coordinates of 714-220 on the map of Halaleh.

7. On 22 August 1991, at 1840 hours, four Iraqi soldiers were observed constructing a bunker at the geographical coordinates of 70-21 on the map of Chezabeh.

8. On 23 August 1991, five Iraqi soldiers were observed constructing a bunker at the geographical coordinates of 714-220 on the map of Halaleh.

9. On 24 August 1991, 18 Iraqi soldiers were observed engaged in military exercises at the geographical coordinates of 56-41 on the map of north Noor.

10. On 24 August 1991, a number of anti-revolutionary elements dispatched from Iraq were observed at the geographical coordinates of 268-886 on the map of Siparoz.

11. On 25 August 1991, at 1530 hours, 56 mortar shells of 81 mm and 120 mm calibre were fired from Iraq towards the northern side of Gardpey base. The mortar shells hit 500 metres away from the village of Groomis at the geographical coordinates of 475-865 on the map of Sardasht and resulted in the martyrdom of a village woman.

12. On 25 August 1991, 15 anti-revolutionary elements dispatched from Iraq attached an Iranian border patrol between border pillars Nos. 444 and 445 situated between Dogoosh and Meidan border posts. Following the arrival of forces from the neighbouring border posts the attacking anti-revolutionaries retreated into Iraq.

13. On 26 August 1991, at 0645 hours, some 40 anti-revolutionary elements dispatched from Iraq attacked Shalmash base in the Sardasht area. As a result two Iranians were martyred, five others were injured and one was kidnapped.

14. On 26 August 1991, Iraqi forces deployed a mortar launcher at the geographical coordinates of 594-335 on the map of Kani Sheikh.

15. On 27 August 1991, at 1010 hours, five Iraqi soldiers were observed constructing an observation position along the border pillars at the geographical coordinates of 293-821 on the map of Nahr-e-Anbar.

16. On 27 August 1991, at 1330 hours, some 40 anti-revolutionary elements dispatched from Iraq were observed transporting ammunition by mules at the geographical coordinates of 95-95 on the map of Dizaj and Shayk Rivas valley.

17. On 29 August 1991, at 1330 hours, an Iranian soldier carrying arms and binoculars on patrol was kidnapped by Iraqi forces in the Sarbard area of Siparoz.

18. On 11 September 1991, at 2230 hours, anti-revolutionary elements dispatched from Iraq attacked Iranian forces in the vicinity of Banavileh village in Baneh which resulted in the death of six anti-revolutionary elements.

19. On 12 September 1991, at 1800 hours, several Iraqi officers and a jeep were observed checking the area at the geographical coordinates of 291-821 on the map of Nahr-e-Anbar.

20. On 15 September 1991, at 1850 hours, six Iraqi soldiers were observed constructing a bunker at the geographical coordinates of 542-246 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin.

21. On 15 August 1991, some 60 anti-revolutionary elements dispatched from Iraq were observed at Syah Kooh at the geographical coordinates of 92-82 on the map of Siparoz. Following the reaction of Iranian forces they retreated into Iraq.

22. On 16 August 1991, at 0900 hours, an anti-revolutionary element dispatched from Iraq was arrested at the geographical coordinates of 96-86 on the map of Siparoz.

23. On 17 August 1991, an Iraqi patrol unit at the geographical coordinates of 586-243 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin approached the Iranian position. Following the reaction of Iranian guards the Iraq unit retreated into Iraq.

24. On 18 August 1991, at 1400 hours, an Iraqi heavy vehicle with 12 soldiers on board and which was hauling an anti-aircraft gun was deployed at the geographical coordinates of 410-561 on the map of Naft-Shahr.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter was circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kamal KHARRAZI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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UNITED
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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/23189
31 October 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 30 OCTOBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to report the following Iraqi violations of the terms of cease-fire.

1. On 27 September 1991, several Iraqi soldiers were observed in no man's land around the geographical coordinates of 430-660 on the map of Naft Shahr.

2. On 28 September 1991, two Iraqi patrol guards attempted to infiltrate the Khosravi border post at the geographical coordinates of 43-05 on the map of Khosravi inside the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Following the reaction of the Iranian border guards the Iraqi soldiers retreated into Iraq.

3. On 28 September 1991, 15 Iraqi soldiers were observed engaged in military exercises in no man's land at the geographical coordinates of 56-41 on the map of Hoor.

4. On 30 September 1991, a number of anti-revolutionary elements dispatched from Iraq attempted to infiltrate the position of Iranian forces during the night at the geographical coordinates of 454-071 on the map of Khosravi. Following the reaction of the Iranian forces they retreated into Iraq.

5. On 30 September 1991, at 2030 and 2200 hours, anti-revolutionary elements dispatched from Iraq created a confrontation with Iranian border guards around the geographical coordinates of 975-418 on the map of Marivan.

6. On 3 October 1991, at 1500 hours, an Iraqi loader was observed constructing an embankment in no man's land around the geographical coordinates of 291-821 on the map of Nahr-e-Anbar.

7. On 4 October 1991, at 2230 hours, an Iraqi helicopter violated Iranian airspace and landed at Hoveizeh. The occupants of the

helicopter contacted two anti-revolutionary elements on the spot and, following the intervention of the Iranian forces, the helicopter flew away to Iraq.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter was circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kamal KHARRAZI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/23190
1 November 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 1 NOVEMBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BELGIUM TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to ask you to bring to the attention of the members of the Security Council the position of the Belgian Government with regard to the withdrawal of Belgian troops from Zaire.

On the morning of 31 October 1991, the Belgian Government took the following decision:

> "The evacuation of Belgian nationals should be nearing its completion by this Friday, 1 November. The Belgian Government has therefore ordered the withdrawal of its military detachment from Zaire. This operation will be carried out in such a manner as to ensure the return of the entire regiment to Belgium as soon as possible".

I should be grateful if this letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Paul NOTERDAEME
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/23191
31 October 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

# REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION II (UNAVEM II)

(For the period 31 May 1991-25 October 1991)

## Introduction

1. On 30 May 1991, the Security Council adopted resolution 696 (1991), the operative part of which reads as follows:

> "1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General 1/ and the addendum 2/ and the recommendations therein;
>
> "2. Decides accordingly to entrust a new mandate to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (henceforth UNAVEM II) as proposed by the Secretary-General in line with the "Acordos de Paz para Angola", and requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to this effect;
>
> "3. Also decides to establish UNAVEM II for a period of 17 months from the date of adoption of the present resolution in order to accomplish the objectives stated in the report of the Secretary-General;
>
> "4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council immediately after the signature of the 'Acordos de Paz para Angola' and to keep the Council fully informed of further developments."

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"1/ S/22627.

"2/ S/22627/Add.1.

2. The purpose of the present report is to provide the Security Council with an account of the activities during the first five months of UNAVEM II in accordance with paragraph 4 of resolution 696 (1991).

Mandate of UNAVEM II

3. It will be recalled that the mandate of UNAVEM II, in accordance with the Peace Accords for Angola (S/22609, enclosure), is:

(a) To verify the arrangements agreed by the two Angolan parties (the Government of Angola on the one hand and the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) on the other) for monitoring the cease-fire, as set out in the Cease-fire Agreement (S/22609, attachment I), which forms part of the Peace Accords for Angola;

(b) To verify the arrangements agreed by the two Angolan parties for monitoring the Angolan police during the cease-fire period, as set out in section III of the Protocol of Estoril (S/22609, attachment IV), which forms part of the Peace Accords for Angola.

Verification tasks arising from the Peace Accords for Angola

4. It will further be recalled that the arrangements for the cease-fire are set out in detail in the Cease-fire Agreement which, together with its annexes and appendices, is the first of the four documents constituting the Peace Accords for Angola. The modalities for the verification and monitoring of the cease-fire are described in sections III and IV of that document and are amplified in its annex I. They may be summarized as follows:

(a) A Joint Political-Military Commission (CCPM) has been formed, composed of representatives of the Government and of UNITA, as members, and of representatives of Portugal, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, as observers. A representative of the United Nations may be invited to participate in the meetings of CCPM. UNAVEM II has been invited to participate, as an observer, in the Political Commission of CCPM and its technical group on police matters;

(b) A Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission (CMVF) has been formed with the same composition as CCPM, to which it reports. A representative of the United Nations is invited to its meetings;

(c) CMVF has established monitoring groups, which are subordinate to it, composed in equal numbers of representatives of the Government and of UNITA. They are unarmed;

(d) The monitoring groups are responsible for monitoring on the spot the observance of the cease-fire, including responsibility for preventing, verifying and investigating possible violations thereof;

(e) The monitoring groups have been organized in six regions and deployed on a full-time basis at each of the assembly areas where the troops of the two sides are being assembled. The monitoring groups have also been deployed at certain airports and border posts;

(f) The role of United Nations personnel, who have their own command structure, is to verify that the CMVF monitoring groups are assuming their responsibilities. This includes United Nations support in the investigation and resolution of alleged violations of the cease-fire. The security of the United Nations personnel, who are also unarmed, is the responsibility of the party that controls the zone where they are present.

5. In addition to the verification of the cease-fire, the Peace Accords also refer to a role for the United Nations in monitoring the Angolan police. The neutrality of the police, whose functions and activities are the Government's responsibility, is to be monitored by police monitoring teams composed of members designated by the Government and by UNITA, whose work is to be verified by police monitors of UNAVEM II. As reported in paragraphs 27 and 28 below, little progress has so far been achieved by the parties in establishing the police monitoring teams.

6. The mandate of UNAVEM II began on the date on which the cease-fire entered into force, namely 31 May 1991, and will last until the day following the completion of presidential and legislative elections in Angola, which the Peace Accords stipulate are to be held in the period between 1 September and 30 November 1992. The parties have reached an understanding to take into consideration the observers' proposal that the elections be held during the first part of the suggested period, preferably between 1 September and 1 October 1992.

## I. Organization of the Mission

7. Brigadier-General Péricles Ferreira Gomes (Brazil) commanded UNAVEM II as Chief Military Observer from 31 May 1991, the date on which its mandate began, until 1 October 1991.

8. On 1 October 1991, Major-General Edward Ushie Unimna (Nigeria) took over command of UNAVEM II as Chief Military Observer.

9. A command group, chaired by the Chief Military Observer and comprising also the Deputy Chief Military Observer, the Chief of Staff and Operations, the Senior Political Adviser, and the Chief Administrative Officer, has been established to assist the Chief Military Observer in the exercise of his command.

10. On 25 October 1991, UNAVEM II comprised the following personnel:

| | |
|---|---|
| Military observers | 350 |
| Military medical personnel | 14 |
| Police monitors | 89 |
| International civilian staff | 54 |
| Local civilian staff | 41 |
| Total | 548 |

11. The United Nations Military Observers have been contributed by the following 24 Member States: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Congo, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, India, Ireland, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Senegal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Yugoslavia and Zimbabwe.

12. The police monitors have been contributed by the following nine Member States: Argentina, Brazil, Ireland, Malaysia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Sweden and Zimbabwe.

13. UNAVEM II is also currently equipped with a civilian air unit consisting of one fixed-wing cargo aircraft and 12 utility helicopters. In addition, UNAVEM hires, whenever necessary, a heavy cargo aircraft and a small passenger aircraft.

## II. Deployment of UNAVEM II in the field

14. Angola, its infrastructure and its population have been ravaged by almost 31 years of war; about 70 per cent of the roads are unusable because of mines and/or their very poor condition; telephone and other communications are extremely limited; water, food and fuel supplies in many areas are scarce or non-existent. Many tropical diseases, including malaria, are prevalent throughout the country.

15. Immediately after the adoption of resolution 696 (1991), the Secretary-General took steps to implement the new mandate entrusted to UNAVEM II. Advance parties were deployed on 2 June 1991 to five of the six regional headquarters (S/22672, para. 2). Subsequently, the Chief Military Observer decided to phase the deployment of observer teams to regional headquarters, assembly areas and critical points over five stages. This was necessary for several reasons.

16. The military observers who were available in Angola following the termination of the UNAVEM I mandate were sufficient to carry out only a small part of the new mandate. In any case, reconnaissance had to be carried out at each of the 50 assembly areas and 12 critical points at which five-man and two-man teams of military observers were to be deployed respectively. Both parties were slow in establishing joint monitoring groups, deploying their troops to the assembly areas and granting UNAVEM authorization to conduct reconnaissance in those areas, many of which were subsequently changed to other locations. The delay in the approval of the Mission's budget, which did not take place until two-and-a-half months after the Security Council's decision to establish UNAVEM II, and the consequent shortfalls in logistics support for it, also made it practically impossible to occupy all the assembly areas simultaneously.

17. UNAVEM II's deployment in the field was completed at all assembly areas in use by the end of September 1991.

18. The five main deployment phases are described below:

(a) Phase I (2 June-9 July). Regional headquarters were deployed in five of the six regions: Huambo, Luanda, Lubango, Luena and Saurimo. The Government's forces (FAPLA) and those of UNITA (FALA) provided liaison officers who participated in the reconnaissance of some 20 other sites at which UNAVEM II was to be deployed. Accommodation, logistic resources, medical facilities and essential services were looked into at each location and found to be lacking in most of them;

(b) Phase II (10 July-23 July). The remaining regional headquarters was deployed at Mavinga. Five-man United Nations Military Observer teams were deployed at the following assembly areas: Banja (later Chingongo) (team temporarily located in Lobito); Namibe; Dinge and Necutu (later Chimbuande) (teams temporarily located in Cabinda); Soyo; M'banza Congo; Negage; Bie; Menonque; Malange. Reconnaissance was conducted at three further locations;

(c) Phase III (24 July-31 July). During this phase, little reconnaissance took place because FALA had not cleared movement by UNAVEM personnel into the assembly areas assigned to them in the Peace Accords. Five-man teams were deployed at the following assembly areas: Bungo (team temporarily located at Negage); Capanda; Cafunfo; Sambo (team temporarily located at Huambo); Matala; Cahama; Dondo. A two-man team and a UNAVEM Liaison Officer were also deployed to UNITA's headquarters at Jamba;

(d) Phase IV (1 August-4 September). At the beginning of August, UNAVEM II was notified of changes in the locations of various (mostly FALA) assembly areas. Nine areas were deleted from the list attached to the Peace Accords for Angola and eight others were added. On 9 August permission was finally received to conduct reconnaissance into FALA assembly areas. This led to an intense period of reconnaissance missions, by air and road, to 20 previously unvisited locations. Five-man teams were deployed at the following assembly areas during this phase: Cazombo; Chicala; Wako Kungo; Cambandua; Chipindo; Quilengues (temporarily located at Lubango); Bimbe; Chingongo; Kuemba. The first UNAVEM police monitors were also deployed during this phase, beginning on 26 August, to the following locations: Cabinda; Negage (for Uige); M'banza Congo; Huambo; Lobito; Bie; Namibe; Lubango; Menongue; Lucapa; Saurimo. Thus, at the end of this phase, UNAVEM II was deployed at 32 assembly areas, six of which were located with the six regional headquarters;

(e) Phase V (5 September-30 September). A further sequence of intense air and road reconnaissance missions was carried out in the early part of September. Five-man teams were deployed at the following assembly areas: Quilengues (from Lubango); Chingongo (from Lobito); Quela; Mussende; Cambandua; Bailundo; N'Gove; Sambo (from Huambo); Xa-Cassau (team withdrawn from Chimbuande); Nharea (team withdrawn from Chimbuande); Kindege; Chipindo; Muconda; Quibala; Mucuio; Quirima.

19. Thus, UNAVEM II had by 30 September 1991 completed its deployment at all 46 areas at which the forces of the two sides were assembling. This

discrepancy as regards the 50 assembly areas listed in the Peace Accords is due to the fact that two assembly areas are still under discussion or review by CMVF and the two planned for Dinge and Chimbuande in Cabinda have not so far been established because of serious security problems in that province. Police monitors were deployed to the following locations during phase V: Malange; Lucapa; Cabinda; Cahama; Caxito; Sumbe; Xangongo; Mavinga. These deployments ensured that, by the end of September 1991, all the 18 provincial capitals had a UNAVEM police presence. UNAVEM already has 89 policemen, although not all of them are deployed to outposts yet.

## III. Logistics

20. Military observers and police monitors have been deployed, in some cases since 2 June 1991, with only the bare minimum of logistic support. Purchase of many major items, such as communications equipment, prefabricated housing and generators, had to be delayed because of the delay in the approval of the Mission's budget. As a result living accommodation in the field ranges from relatively comfortable prefabricated shelters to tents, war-ravaged buildings and grass huts, which give little protection against poisonous snakes, rats and insects. Water is another problem: in some sites water has to be carried from as far as 2 kilometres away; in one case it can be supplied only by air.

21. The absence of military engineer support for UNAVEM II has aggravated these problems. Attempts are being renewed to obtain such support from a Member State. The extreme shortage of food, water and fuel in almost all areas has increased the need for air support, with an unforeseen increase in aviation fuel costs. No substantial amount of general or technical material is available locally. UNAVEM accordingly depends almost entirely on purchases from outside the country, with resultant delays in delivery and high freight costs. The establishment of tolerable living conditions for UNAVEM personnel in the field and other unforeseen needs will require additional financial provision for the Mission and I will shortly present proposals in this regard to the General Assembly.

## IV. Observance of the cease-fire and incidents

22. The cease-fire has in general been well respected by both sides since it took effect on 31 May 1991. Most of the incidents have been relatively minor. The following are some examples:

(a) Malange (northern region): on 7 August the local FAPLA Commander complained that he and the Governor of Malange had been stopped on a road by about 30 FALA soldiers and forced to return to Malange. At a subsequent CMVF meeting in Malange, FALA said the incident had resulted from a breakdown in communications. After a long discussion, it was agreed by the two sides that there should be free movement on all roads, in conformity with the Peace Accords, and that in future the police should control the roads;

(b) Cuito Cuanavale (south-eastern region): on 9 August a FALA colonel was stopped by FAPLA troops while en route from Cuito Cuanavale to Menongue. The matter was resolved by a UNAVEM team, which found that there had been a series of misunderstandings between FALA and FAPLA;

(c) Cuito Cuanavale (south-eastern region): on 3 September the UNAVEM Team Commander reported that the local FAPLA Commander was not providing adequate information about his assembly area and was restricting the UNAVEM team's movements. On 4 September, the matter was raised with the FAPLA Chief of Staff, who gave an assurance that freedom of movement for the Cuito Cuanavale UNAVEM team would be guaranteed from that day;

(d) Lucapa (north-eastern region): on 13 September after a United Nations helicopter and aircraft had just taken off, the airport at Lucapa was the target of small-arms fire. FAPLA stated that the attack had been carried out by ex-FAPLA soldiers who had become bandits;

(e) Lobito (central region): on 21 September police reported that about 200 UNITA supporters had occupied the residential house of the Police Department, which had earlier been the property of UNITA. The UNAVEM team and two police officers, with the CMVF monitoring group, went to the house. Arms and ammunition were moved from it to the central police station at Lobito. After negotiations, the crowd left peacefully. The house was closed and left empty.

23. One of the most serious incidents occurred at Malange (northern region) on 30 September when the body of a UNITA political officer, Colonel Pedro Macanga, was found by UNAVEM and FALA teams. The colonel's car had apparently been ambushed on the previous night. The colonel's driver and three bodyguards (two of them injured) were found and interviewed. The next day, on 1 October, senior FAPLA and FALA officers from CMVF held a meeting, attended by the local UNAVEM Team Commander, at which the tense situation in the district, resulting from the killing, was discussed. FALA said that the circumstances pointed to FAPLA responsibility, while FAPLA noted that the killing had been carried out in a recognized FALA area. With the support of UNAVEM, both sides finally agreed on the need for restraint and that the killing should not be allowed to jeopardize the peace process.

## V. Confinement of FAPLA and FALA troops to assembly areas

24. According to the Peace Accords, the assembly of both sides' forces in the assembly areas was due to have been completed by 1 August 1991. Later this was rescheduled for 15 September 1991. However, more than two-and-a-half months after the initial date, on 22 October 1991, less than 60 per cent of the projected total of FAPLA and FALA troops were in the assembly areas. According to UNAVEM's count, a total of 95,634 troops (68,666 FAPLA and 26,968 FALA) were in 45 assembly areas (the 3 Cabinda assembly areas not yet being occupied), compared with the projected total strength for all assembly areas of 165,440 troops (115,640 FAPLA and 49,800 FALA).

25. The two sides have cited various reasons for this serious delay in implementing a key provision of the Peace Accords. The most important is their difficulty in providing the necessary logistic support for their forces in the assembly areas, many of which are, in accordance with the Peace Accords, located away from populated areas. They have also referred to their difficulty in transporting their forces to the assembly areas. In the case of FALA this has involved moving troops, often accompanied by their families, over long distances on foot; FAPLA, on the other hand, is an army which has, to an important extent, deployed its forces, with their heavy equipment, in towns and other fixed installations and has lacked the means of transport needed to move them to the assembly areas. Questions have also been raised about the figures originally given by the two sides for their total strengths and about the categories of forces as well as weapons that must be assembled in accordance with the Accords. UNAVEM II has expressed understanding of the two sides' difficulties but has nevertheless urged them to make every effort to complete the assembly of forces at the earliest possible date. Recent steps taken by the United Nations in this regard are described in paragraph 31 below.

26. Some of the above-described difficulties have also contributed to delay in the establishment by CMVF of the joint monitoring groups foreseen in the Peace Accords. Even where established, these groups have often had difficulty in organizing themselves to carry out the functions attributed to them under the Accords. While helping them, wherever possible, to overcome these difficulties, UNAVEM II has increasingly taken the initiative by itself monitoring some aspects of the Accords and both sides welcomed this. For instance, in early September 1991, with the agreement of both parties, UNAVEM II took the lead in instituting the regular counting of troops in all the occupied assembly areas. UNAVEM II was thus able to play a key role in producing impartial and clear figures, using its presence in all the areas and its communications to help to foster confidence between the two sides. Subsequently the Mission started regular counting of weapons in each of the assembly areas.

## VI. Police monitoring

27. While UNAVEM police monitors are now deployed in all of Angola's 18 provinces, the failure of the two sides to establish the police monitoring teams foreseen in the Peace Accords has prevented the UNAVEM police monitors from carrying out the functions ascribed to them. Nevertheless, police monitoring of a kind has begun and is likely to become more important as the peace process moves forward. It has already become clear that it is essential for the police monitors, even more than the military observers, to be able to understand and speak Portuguese or to be provided with adequate interpreters. The availability of the latter in Angola is proving to be limited and it may therefore become necessary, in the light of experience, to make adjustments to the composition of the police component in UNAVEM II.

28. It has also become clear that there is a widely held misconception about the role of the UNAVEM police monitors and the joint monitoring groups whose activities it is their task to verify. UNAVEM is therefore taking steps to explain that neither it nor the joint monitoring groups have any executive responsibility for the maintenance of law and order, which continues to rest with the existing police forces. The role of the monitoring teams and of the UNAVEM police monitors is to verify that the existing police forces carry out their duties in a manner that is politically neutral and respects the human and political rights of individuals. This function will become particularly important as the election process gets under way.

## VII. Elections

29. No decision has yet been taken by the Angolan authorities to request the United Nations to provide either technical assistance or electoral observers for the forthcoming elections (see S/22627, para. 9). There are, however, strong indications of a growing consensus in Angola that the United Nations should be involved. It has been explained to the Angolan authorities that the provision of election observers would require a further decision of the Security Council and that, given the extreme complexities of such an operation, it is important that any request for United Nations involvement should be received as quickly as possible, so that appropriate recommendations may be made to the Security Council in good time.

## VIII. Observations

30. It is a great pleasure to be able to report to the Security Council that the cease-fire in Angola has now held for over five months. This is a result on which both sides are to be congratulated. It provides a sound basis for implementation of all the other provisions of the Peace Accords for Angola.

31. As reported above, the two sides have been less successful in complying with the Peace Accords' provisions relating to the assembly of troops. Two-and-a-half months after that process was supposed to be complete, barely 60 per cent of the troop numbers declared by both sides had been assembled in the assembly areas, a state of affairs which undermines confidence and, at worst, could imperil implementation of various other aspects of the Peace Accords. It nevertheless has to be recognized that the assembly and confinement of such large numbers of troops, often accompanied by their families, in the time scale provided in the Peace Accords has presented both sides with genuine logistical difficulties, especially in the provision of logistical support in the assembly areas. At the request of both sides, the United Nations has launched an emergency food programme whose effect will be to relieve shortages of food in the assembly areas while troops wait there before being demobilized or absorbed into the new Angolan Armed Forces in accordance with the Peace Accords. The United Nations has recently conveyed to the two sides some suggestions for overcoming the practical difficulties that have impeded the assembly process. I have urged both sides to give these

ideas serious consideration with a view to completing the assembly of their forces during the next two or three weeks. At the same time I raised with them the need for proper custody of weapons which, in many cases, are not properly controlled and guarded in the assembly areas.

32. Although it is not strictly within the mandate of UNAVEM II, I should like to underline the essential importance of the formation of the new Angolan Armed Forces as an integral part of the peace process. Not only will this create armed forces in which both sides can have full confidence; it will also permit the demobilization of those not chosen for the new armed forces and the closure of the assembly areas. It is obviously desirable that these should be closed as soon as possible in order to minimize the hardships for the troops involved and the costs to the international community of maintaining the necessary monitoring and verification machinery in so many different locations. It is also to be noted that, if demobilization is to succeed and contribute to the implementation of the peace accords, measures will need to be taken to reintegrate the demobilized troops into civilian life, measures for which the Angolan authorities may seek international help. Meanwhile, I am glad to be able to report that the plans for the formation of the new Angolan Armed Forces are proceeding on schedule, with the help of advisers from France, Portugal and the United Kingdom. I have urged on all concerned the need for the agreed schedule to be adhered to, notwithstanding the delays that have taken place in the assembly of troops.

33. As regards elections, I have recently had consultations with leading personalities from both sides about a possible role for the United Nations. I have explained to them that it seems to me important that, at least as a first step, the United Nations should be invited to provide technical assistance to those who will be responsible for planning and conduct the elections. This is a service that the United Nations has provided to a number of countries in recent years. It seems particularly appropriate in Angola, which will be holding its first democratic elections. As regards a possible role for the United Nations in observing the elections, this is a formidable prospect, given the devastated condition of Angola and the almost total lack of the infrastructure that will be necessary to support United Nations electoral observers. Should I receive a request from the Angolan authorities for the United Nations to observe the elections, I shall of course report immediately to the Security Council.

34. An essential condition for the successful implementation of the Peace accords for Angola is that the joint machinery set up by those accords should work effectively. The Chief Military Observer of UNAVEM II has regularly attended the meetings of CMVF, the body which is primarily concerned with the military aspects, and has been invited with increasing frequency to attend meetings of CCPM, the highest of the joint bodies. He has reported to me that relations between the representatives of the two sides in these bodies have remained excellent in spite of the existence of important points of difference between them, which on one occasion in early September led UNITA to suspend temporarily its participation in the joint bodies. Problems have also sometimes arisen when decisions by CCPM and CMVF have not been conveyed with

sufficient speed and clarity down the chain of command to the monitoring groups at the assembly areas in the field. The three observer delegations, from Portugal, the Soviet Union and the United States, will continue to have a key role to play in helping to resolve these and other difficulties which may in future arise in the working of CCPM and CMVF. They are assured of UNAVEM II's support.

35. In conclusion, I should like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to Brigadier-General Péricles Ferreira Gomes, Chief Military Observer of UNAVEM II until 1 October 1991, and to his successor, Major-General Edward Ushie Unimna for the exemplary manner in which they have commanded UNAVEM II during this critical and formative phase of its mandate. Equal tribute is due to their military and civilian personnel who have, with great courage and determination, established the Mission throughout the length and breadth of Angola in conditions which in some cases are amongst the most difficult that have ever been faced by United Nations peace-keeping personnel. As indicated earlier in the present report, I believe it important that steps be taken urgently to improve the living conditions of the military observers in the worst areas and I shall accordingly be putting forward proposals to the General Assembly during its current session.


UNAVEM II DEPLOYMENT
CONGO
ZAIRE
ZAMBIA
NAMIBIA
BOTSWANA
ATLANTIC OCEAN
Government troop (FAPLA) Assembly Area
UNITA troop (FALA) Assembly Area
Government (FAPLA) "Critical Point"
UNITA (FALA) "Critical Point"
UNAVEM II Headquarters
UNAVEM II Regional Headquarters
UNAVEM II internal boundary
UNAVEM II Military Observers are located in the Assembly Areas and "Critical Points" shown on the map, except Assembly Areas of Dinge and Chimbuande.
Dinge
Cabinda
Chimbuande
Noqui
M'banza Congo
Soyo
Quimbele
Nzeto
Kindege
Bungo
Negage
Quipedro
Marimba
LUANDA
Luanda
Cafunfo
Lucapa
Xa-Cassau
Quela
Cabo Ledo
Capanda
Malange
Dondo
Saurimo
Mussende
Quibala
Quirima
Muconda
Wako Kungo
Andulo
Nharea
Bimbe
Luena
Bailundo
Kuemba
Cazombo
Lobito
Chingongo
Bie/Cuito
Chicala
Huambo
Cambandua
Sambo
N'gove
Chipindo
Bentiaba
Lumbala-Nguimbo
Quilengues
Menongue
Lubango
Matala
Namibe
Mucuio
Cuito Cuanavale
Mavinga
Cahama
Xangongo
Licua
Jamba
Santa Clara
Mucusso
0 75 150 225 300
KILOMETRES
The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
MAP NO. 3655 UNITED NATIONS
OCTOBER 1991